Station 70's Adam Healy on Nation-State Attacks and Crypto's Real Security Problem

Dot co. Adam, thanks for waiting, man. How's it going? It's going. Been a lively weekend. Yes. Yes. It's been a lively weekend. Do you wanna start there, or do you wanna kind of, like, get there after we frame it up a little bit? You just wanna, like, tackle and dive right into that stuff. You know, I usually like a, like, full on forward a little bit. Maybe give everybody a little context. Yeah. I think that'd be great. Thank you for for hopping on here.

And, yeah, we we it's it's been interesting to, you know, look internally. It's like, okay. Whenever things happen that are causing whenever we feel like the community around payments, stablecoins, crypto is starting to centralize on a specific idea or want to go deeper or make it make sense, we feel like it's our job to go and look at our network. And we had an open email thread. We're like, oh, let's let's get Adam on.

Give people give people an overview of things, specifically your background in this conversation and where you feel like you have really earned a lot of the the stripes to be able to kind of come to this podcast and,

yeah, be able to speak about this with with conviction. Such an interesting background. You know, I I think you have to earn it every day than anyone else, but been in the space full time since 2018 or so. I was an early employee at a small custodian that was acquired by Intercontinental Exchange. Custodian along with a few other acquisitions is what became Bakkt. If we all remember kind of, like, the 2020 Bakkt heyday, sadly, that didn't really turn into much of a company.

I I actually don't know what they're doing today. But from there, went on to BlockFi. I was chief security officer there for almost four years, and then that led me to cofound Station SevenDate.

And as I often joke before I got into the land of, you know, Internet money, I'd had a career both in the private sector and primarily in the government space working for the US government, primarily in the intelligence community, but always focused on, like, security topics and oftentimes at that intersection between cybersecurity, kind of what I just call, like, other technical security that doesn't fit neatly into the cyber umbrella and then physical security and kind of cross sorting across those.

So I think that experience, both within the government and private sector and then my experience since 2018 in crypto, has really, like, landed me in this, like, unique spot where I get to see a lot of the risk. I get to have a lot of conversations with a lot of firms, a lot of security officers, a lot of risk officers across large and small crypto platforms.

And I I I think the industry is just in this, like, maturation point where there's a lot of institutional interest, but the industry is also moving very quickly. AI has since, like, entered the discussion in a very prominent way, and that has only accelerated things.

And I think oftentimes what we see, and we've seen this play out many, many times over the last handful of years, but especially over the last maybe nine to six hours is a is a gap within how organizations are thinking about security as a competitive advantage. And for some reason, many in the crypto space still see it as this thing that just slows everything down. But I can tell you firsthand that if you do it right, it really can be a competitive advantage.

Yeah. So swooping in here to this situation, when did you first hear about it? What were your first impressions? How how does someone like you kind of start mapping out how to even explore discovering what's true? Walk us through, like, your even personal experience in the last few days with with learning about this and making an an opinion. So so sadly, I have to ask you, which scenario do you wanna talk about?

Because there's been a few security incidents in the lab, call it week or so, that have really been top of mind. So when we kicked off the show, we we started with April 1 with Drift, but specifically with more on I think Kelpd Out and just with what Arbitrum did this last night or this morning. I think if we wanna focus on that specifically

so that we aren't here for five hours. Yeah. Absolutely. So I would actually think, you know, at some point, we should talk a little bit about Drift also. I I think I I have a lot of, like, perspective on that, especially coming out of the intelligence community and the sophistication of, like, what happened there. Then. If you if if you're excited about Drift, let's do it. So so, yeah, we'll start there. We can we can get into Kelp in a minute or two. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. You're the guest.

I'm I'm just the guy with the questions. Oh, okay. Okay. Well, we guess at least shouldn't drive the discussion, but here here I go. So I care about here's what I care about. I I care about finding people who are reputable and excited and have spent the time to go deep in certain things and not, like, stay up here. Like, I I value that a lot. So if you feel like you've done that with Drift, like, let's go. Yeah. Sounds great.

Well, we we we can talk about both, but let's maybe start with Drift just from, like, a timeline perspective. So, you know, for a long time, for, I don't know, a lot years, decade, maybe more, I I've had this kind of mantra where, like, you know, cyber hygiene one zero one is super important. The analogy that I've used for that is, like, you can take all the antibiotics you want, but if you don't wash your hands, you're still gonna get sick.

And I I I had used that as a way to describe a lot of the data breach that have happened in crypto, say, over the last decade or so. You know, Bybit was a salient example of that. You know, if the Gnosis Safe or Safe folks would have done just a couple cyber hygiene one zero one things right, they probably wouldn't have suffered a breach that would have then led to Bybit and all the other things.

RIFT though was something that, like, really made me recalculate and recalibrate that framework because it was super sophisticated nation state level intelligence operation. That's, like, really the only way that I can describe it. It it it really stemmed from this this hybrid, what I would just consider, like, an integrated attack that stands social engineering, that stand cyber, that stand in person meetings. So, like, there's in person social engineering. This wasn't just email or phone call or text message.

You know, it was very, very sophisticated and took place over many, many months. And then also the threat actor was able to put up, and this gets back to them being nation state backed most likely, and having the budget, which you don't really see in the threat actor space to this degree, of millions of dollars to mobilize on the Drift platform and the Drift protocol to really provide bona fides and say, hey. We're serious. Like, we're an actual, like, shop. Like, we're doing real work.

And and that was just like an incredibly multi month, like, really intelligence operation that was very effective. And and that was like one, like, salient point in this, you know, broader series of data breaches that have occurred over the years within the industry that made me, like, really recalibrate and say, wow. Like, the sophistication is now at a level that is that I would consider, you know, significant.

And very few organizations like, I've I've worked with some of the biggest brands in crypto either directly like BlockFi, or as an adviser. And I won't name the firms that I've done advisory work for, but none of them would have been able to prevent what happened at Drift. And I I think that was one of those cases where usually as a security professional, you know, you wanna dig in, and we can get into kelp in a minute and say, hey. Like, these two things probably went wrong, and they could have been prevented.

And if they would have done, you know, a b c things, they they wouldn't have suffered from this. And, you know, the the the SAFE discussion, the VibeT discussion that I I I opened kind of with is there's a couple things that they could have done, and it would have, you know, cut off that attack vector and and what had happened that Bybit wouldn't have happened. Not the case for what happened with Drift.

And I actually really feel bad for them because they were the victim of a, you know, a very sophisticated nation state level intelligence operation. Yeah. I think it's easy for people and

their own heads to see things like this. And given just the the black eyes that we've seen across the history of this space, it's, like, kind of easy to go and assume that whoever was involved was up to no good or being negligent or doing something wrong. It sounds like from your perspective, this was just an extremely sophisticated attack, like a very, very difficult thing even with someone with extreme security measures put in place, like a very, very well executed attack versus negligence in your view. Yeah.

And, you know, negligence is a legal term, so I I try to not a lawyer, though I try to veer away from, like, legal terms. Know that. Sorry. But but

but I would I I can hear, like, our counsel in, like, the back of my mind saying, don't don't index on that term. But I would say that, yeah, like, there was and, again, I I've I've advised for some of the the biggest brands in crypto, some of the most, you know, largest, most sophisticated firms. And I don't know that they would have been able to prevent that, and I don't even know if us at BlockFi would have been able to prevent that. And we had a incredibly mature security program.

So, yeah, I I and this is one of those cases where I can't point at Drift and say, oh, you should have done these two or three things to cut off these attack vectors. It was really more of a, wow, I have a lot of empathy for them because that was, yeah, a really well executed attack. So then and and with that empathy also comes a little bit of, like, not admiration, but respect maybe for the threat actor. Because you see that, and you're like, wow. That was actually really good.

Like, it was a it was bad, but from an execution perspective, it was like a really well executed

attack. Yeah. What what do you feel like you know, when you're you're coming in, you're advising, and, you know, now everyone is in this position where they're they're trying to prevent this from happening again, either the Drift specifically or other firms like them.

What do we how do you how do you, you know, acknowledging the sophistication of the threat actor and and what they did, what are the key learnings here that, you know, if you were to look at the situation and try to derive some of these key learnings of here's what we're gonna do differently now, what were some of those key areas that you feel like stood out? You know, it's like a really timely question. About a week, maybe two weeks ago, I was actually asked to come in and present to the board,

very large brand, and they asked me a very similar question. And I I kind of bucket risk into, like, really, like, three categories. Right? Like, cyber risk, what I would consider, like, integrated risks, which could be, you know, a whole host of things that don't fit neatly in the cyber umbrella, but many of which are very technical. Things like technical surveillance, other types of non cybernative, but technical risks, and then, like, physical risks.

And that could be meeting people at conferences and having bad operational security, bad levels of paranoia. It could also be some of the wrench attacks that we've seen in the recent months, which have exploded in the industry. And so so when I really think about that, it's like, well, if those are the three buckets that we can categorize risk on, and as we saw with Drift, there were aspects of that attack that touched each of those three buckets of of risk areas.

Well, then the then the recommendation is you have to do all of it well. Right? You can't just have really good cyber network defense. You can't just have, like, really good executive protection and then physical security or in their offices and and key homes of maybe key executives or key board members. But you also have to do all the integrated risk management appropriately. And then you have to do all of those things really, really well. And that is very expensive, and it's very, very hard to do.

There's a there's a signal group chat I'm in with a lot of well known security folks across the industry. You know, we often chat about how you signal for it. I love it. I mean, it is Is there really any other alternative for that group to use? Yeah. I mean, there's much better alternatives than SIG I mean, SIGNAL's not secure. Like, let we can just be, like we can call a state of spade here.

Like, SIGNAL's very good for, like, day to day use, like, non high value discussions, things that are maybe, like, moderate sensitivity. But at the end of the day, like, if a sophisticated threat actor, whether that's nation state level or just a very well resourced group, they're not gonna target signal directly. Right?

Like, imagine a world where they target your underlying device that's maybe missing a critical security patch, And then they just install a key logger, and then every time they see signal load, they take a screenshot every fraction of a second. So they've essentially bypassed signals encryption controls using kind of underlying vulnerabilities in the device. Right? Like, if I was, you know, still working at an intelligence agency and we wanted into a signal chat, that's essentially what we would do. Right?

We would build a custom piece of malware that would deploy would target you in a very specific way, and then we would deploy a key logger to your mobile device that would instrument all your keystrokes, and then we would just take screenshots every time signal loaded. So now we we were able to read all your signal messages, and we're able to see everything you type across your device, and we've essentially defeated signal security without actually defeating signal.

We defeated the underlying operating system or other vulnerabilities in the device. So signal's good, but not like the it's not the silver bullet. Right? I actually wrote a post on on LinkedIn maybe two days ago about the amount of technical sophistication, the amount of tradecraft one would need to really counter and have, like, to to counter a sophisticated adversary and to, like, have integrity and and confidentiality in your in your communications digitally.

But kind of coming back, like, you know, we talk about we talk about a lot of topics, and there's, you know, a bunch of these signal group chats that are out there. And it's it's it's always like very telling how much, like, we all care about security and how much we all internalize you have to do all of these things right across those various those three buckets of risks that I outlined. But at the end of the day, it's, like, very expensive.

And there's only you know, and this is kind of what we what we mute what we muse about often in that group chat is, like, there's maybe only 30 people in the world that can, like, really design custody securely. There's maybe, like, 30 people in the world that, like, really could build us an effective security program at a crypto firm, whether that's a trading shop or a DeFi platform.

Like, the pool of, like, really good talent that could actually put together a security team and build a security program is in the, you know, call it 20 to 50 people globally. And all of those people are very gainfully employed and very, very busy.

So if you're, you know, like a, you know, Drifter and you don't wanna be the next Drift, the amount of resources and time and money you have to put in to actually addressing and doing as I described, all three of those, you know, buckets of risk management really, really well is is almost insurmountable for most firms. Most firms don't have the budget. They don't have the, you know, the headcount, the ability. So it's it's unfortunate, but I think that's just kind of the reality of where we live.

And that was actually a lot of the thesis going into Station 70 when when doctor Adam Ebersaw and I kind of got together and started talking about Station 70. And and he's a brilliant cryptographer at Coinbase and then came and ran cryptography at BlockFi on the security team. When we got together and started talking about Station 70, that was really the part of the thesis was this stuff's really hard to do well. Security is really expensive, and and and the amount of people that can do it well is very few.

So why don't we just start building some of these solving some of these problems through building product and make them SaaS products that are more accessible to the broader industry? And and that was really some of the the underlying thesis when we went out and said, you know, it's it's the right thing to do for the industry, and we can probably raise some money for it and and get some venture back in.

But at the end of the day, it it's still the right thing to do for the industry, and and we can demystify and bring to bear software products that help companies across the industry and across size and budget spectrum

that to have access to tools that we only seen at places like BlockFi and Coinbase and, like, really sophisticated firms. Yeah. What so the supply of people in the world who are able to, with expertise, come in and and build these types of programs or products from from zero are very few in your view. Do you do you feel like right now, where are those people typically employed? Are they if you were to, like, break up that bucket, are they working at, like, really large exchanges?

Like, you mentioned Coinbase and folks like that. Are they on the government side? Are they building their own startups? Like, are they kind of mixed around? Are they being employed by, like, big tech? Or is it sort of Yeah. I I think I I think that skill set that is specifically focused

and has the expertise in the in the crypto industry. Right? Whether, again, whether that's building a DeFi protocol or building a custodian or building an MPC product, whatever. I would say it's a cross section. Right? You you hit on a few. Right? There are really big firms that can afford them that have the budget. They've decided to go build their own company like we did at Station seventy. Sadly, and not sadly for them, but sadly for the industry, a decent number of them have, like, just retired. Right?

They they were in early on Bitcoin. They ran a couple waves, and now they're doing advising and board work and consulting, but they don't really have, like, a full time gig. And they don't want a full time gig because they've they've made enough money to where they're they're What's the talent pool look like for new and emerging

experts within security?

Or, like, where can people become sufficient in understanding this type of stuff? And is it more of just, like, you gotta go through the years of building this and seeing behind the scenes and going through seasons like you've had, or is is that really the kind of forcing functions to being an expert is kind of just doing it directly over time? I mean, I think it is if you just wanna, like, directly find, like, senior people. Right? You need people that have been around for a few cycles.

You need people that have seen and have what I would consider like an adversarial mindset. Right? I I have this problem. Like, you know, the version of autism that I have is, like, I can't see something, whether that's a system, whether that's a building, whether that's a human, and think about how can I and I and I I I basically can't not think about using the double negative there about like how could I break that? Right? Like if I'm in this building, if I didn't belong here, well, how would I get back in?

If I'm using this platform and I'm typing away, well, I wonder if they're doing this. I wonder if they have this in place. And I I just instinctively wanna, like, pressure test that. And, you know, also the same thing for a human. Right? And then that, you know, getting into, like, the wrench attack topics, like, that's become even more pronounced. And you know I mean? But what is wrench attack? What does that mean?

So the the whole premise, and I forget where this came from, and I should know this, but, you know, this is a thirty year old term probably, if not more. And the whole idea is it doesn't matter how strong your vault is, how good your cryptography is, how many combos do you have on the safe.

If I could just get the person, you know, grab them, physically grab them that has the combo or has the passphrase or has the backups and just hit them with a wrench enough times, they're eventually going to give me the thing I want, which is the codes or the keys or the passwords or the access tokens more sophisticated. Well, it's it's the the joke and this is this has been a term that's been around for decades. Right? And it's it's the $5 wrench attack.

It doesn't matter how many millions you invest into your wallet infrastructure. I can defeat that with a $5 wrench. Yes. And that's becoming even more pronounced. And something that I've been saying recently, which is very, very unpopular in the space, I've taken a ton of flack for it, is oftentimes the cyber controls that we've put in place, especially around wallets, things like multisig, you know, multi party controls.

You need somebody from three different teams to approve a transaction in your wallet or, you know, whatever. Those cyber controls actually can expose you to more risk on the physical side. You know, there there was a there was an event in Canada maybe eighteen months ago where somebody had a hotel room invasion, and their wife and children were held at gunpoint. Their wife and children were traveling with them at this at a particular crypto conference.

And their and and this individual's wife and kid was held at gunpoint until he ended up moving what ended up being several million dollars in crypto to the the the bad guys in this case. And at that point in time, I can assure you that the last thing he wanted in place was multisig and multiple teams to have to approve and him to have to call his CFO because that was just going to prolong this very violent physical encounter. So, unfortunately, you have to do both, and you have to think about both.

This gets back to doing everything right, especially when you're countering more sophisticated adversaries. But those types of controls are great historically for the industry, but were really designed out of this, well, how do we present a cyber breach from causing us to move funds up nefariously or, you know, a bad actor being able to move funds internal to the platform? But those exact controls actually expose your organization, your individuals, your key executives to outsized physical risk.

So I'm not saying don't do those cyber controls. I'm just saying when you thoughtfully design a security program, you have to take all of those things to into account and make sure that you're approaching all of the risks, getting back to doing everything well, and not just some of the risks. Yeah. What what is the so moving in, you were framing Station seventy a little bit. What is the relationship

right now that Station seventy is having with with companies that you serve? What does that type of relationship look like? What are the the different flavors or models that it typically takes? It sounds like you're you're solving this interesting ply issue in some ways of, like, people who you would need to bring in internally to go build and pay for and and expand programs in the security internally the internal security sense for these types of clients.

You instead can or in addition to bring in Station seventy, work with your your you guys, your platform. What does that typically look like? What are some of the key things that you're most often bringing to the table at Station seventy?

I I I mean, it depends on the firm, right, that we're working with. At at the end of the day, like, we're a software product company. Right? We build products that are easy to use, that are hyper secured, that are well audited, and that are really built through the lens of a CISO. And that's when I was as a, you know, chief security officer or chief information security officer at various crypto firms, what would I have wanted to see in order to bring in a vendor to solve certain security problems?

And that's really the the framework in which the DNA framework of the company. But but generally, you know, we work with banks. We work with trading shops. We work with hedge funds. We work with trad fi firms that are getting into crypto. We work with a wide spectrum.

At this point, you know, our primary kind of flagship product is called Bunker, and that's essentially a disaster recovery, key backup recovery platform suite of tools that if you're using any type of self custody, right, whether it's an MPC wallet or you're using ledgers or you're using MetaMask, it doesn't matter. Institutional though, right, we focus only on institutional claims.

If you're using any of those, you can snap into our bunker product and have disaster recovery, right, really to prevent kind of the scenario that unfolded with Prime Trust. Right? They moved some things around, ended up not having the keys to those wallets. Big problem. I think it was seventy five million dollars were lost. So ultimately put them out of business. So we have a really nice suite of products. That product's been in production for about fifteen months.

We have hundreds and hundreds of clients at this point, many of them, not many, a handful of which are listed on our website. But we are constantly growing in terms of who our customer is, and we've been very happy with that product and the reception from the industry. We've recently entered into our first kind of customer betas with our second product called Castle.

That's essentially a modern take on multifactor auth, And we are, like, very, very eager to get that into general availability, but we have some very interesting capabilities that we can use MPC for around identity access controls, multifactor auth that no one else has ever built. I don't know why they've ever built it. This was a product I wanted to have ten years ago, but here we are.

And then we have a product that we really just started bringing to the institutional market from a kind of, like, early alpha perspective called gatekeeper. And that's really what we looked at with this just change huge change in AI is changing everything. We we wanted to figure out what do we do really well. We're really good at key management. We're really good at cryptography. We're really good at security infrastructure. Well, what is our angle in helping the industry?

And not just crypto, but also any legacy company, any Fortune 500, any, you know, traditional firm. What's our angle in this, like, AI ecosystem? And we decided, you know what's lacking is a comprehensive control plane that allows you to do to to to not only supervise, but secure, manage, and control data that's moving between your AI tool of choice, whether that's ChatGPT or Claude or whatever, and underlying MCP services that you may be integrating with.

So if you think about kind of Gatekeeper as this security engine in the middle that allows you to do access policies, that allows you to do things like data loss prevention, that allows you to do things like key management. Maybe you don't want your AI engine to have access to your private key or to your API token for high consequence actions that you're using for downstream MCP services. That's where Gatekeeper fits in. And and it's a very interesting product, and we're very, like, much in early alpha with that.

We have a long list of of customers that have already kind of put their hand in the air and are wanting access to that alpha test because it's it's basically needed. We needed it at Station 70, which is partly why we built it. Yep. And then we we realized that everyone else kind of has this problem. And I have this epiphany. I was at a, you know, I don't a top 30 hedge fund a couple months ago, and I was realizing that all of their traders were talking about OpenClaw and using AI to do agentic trade in.

And, like, I don't think they were doing it yet, but they were all talking about it. And I was and I just kind of have this epiphany of, well, how are you gonna do that safely? Because every time we run a test and we've tried to give a private key or some type of sensitive data string to an AI tool, it tries to do something weird with it. Right? It tries to commit it to GitHub. It tries to stick it somewhere that it shouldn't stick it. And we said, you know, we need to build a product around this.

And that was really kind of the genesis of gatekeepers providing that comprehensive control plane around AI interactions with downstream MCP services. Cool. It seems like you're kind of now rounding. You have the identity on maybe this side or the I can see a network effect happening here as both of these things work and and successfully play together. Do you see Well, that's what all our investors that's what all our investors hope. That's what they like to do. You know? Yeah.

I I think I take a little bit more of, like, an altruistic view of it, which is, like, these products are needed. We continue to see data breaches across the industry. And not just crypto, but for a product like Gatekeeper, you know, how many data breaches have we seen in legacy companies? Or pick your Fortune 500. They've probably have had a major data breach at some point. And really from more of my perspective, like, products are needed, and that's why we're building them.

And I believe that if we build good products that solve real problems, we'll get paid for them over a time horizon. Love that. Last question for you, Adam, as we we close here. I know this this was really quick. What would be your just just message to the community of people who are following this specifically,

and maybe just to drift since we spent most of the time talking about that, what would be the from a secure put your security hat stand hat on and and give kind of a final word to the people impacted or or going through that? And also ended what we didn't really talk about the recovery or what ended up happening with with Tethr and stuff like that. But what what's your, like, kind of key learnings from from this situation? Yeah.

So so I would say first, like, the the security community in crypto is very small, but also very approachable. So, you know, everyone that's in the industry probably knows someone that knows me or knows somebody else that, you know, is in that kind of security professional space. So reach out to people, build that network, and have access to people. You know, I I often talk about how I ended up at BlockFi

was because Zach Prince and I had met a few months before that. And then in May 2020, BlockFi had a data breach. And Zach sends me this email and is like, hey. Can you hop on a call? And they didn't have a security program. So reach out. Security community in crypto is very approachable. There there's always people that are willing to help and do it proactively. Don't do it like Zac did when the crisis is unfolding.

In terms of, like, the whole Kelp incident, you know, I would say just generally, I'm not a big fan of bridges. I think there's a ton of risk associated with them. So if you're going to use something like a cross chain bridge, if you're going down that path, be very, very thoughtful about it. And with everything that is easy to use, with everything that moves fast, you're assuming a lot of risk. And sometimes that risk is your customers, sometimes it's your capital, sometimes that risk is your your client's capital.

So you have to be very thoughtful and you do have a duty to protect that data, that information, that money. So you you know, you have to be thoughtful as you go down some of these more risky, more nascent areas of the industry. Adam, as a takeaway for us, let's talk about how we can support more

education around this stuff. I feel like there's an opportunity to try to get more wisdom in the hands of people who might be asking those questions, and sounds like you're connected to such a amazing group of people who who know so much about this stuff, and it'd be really fun to explore how we could work together to tell more of those stories, learnings, expose, like, in a thoughtful way. Yeah. More of a spotlight on that. That could be fun.

Well well, first, you should have me on more often, so that's probably, like, one thing we can do. I'm here every Tuesday and Thursday. You know where to find me. Okay. Fair. Fair.

You know, second, you know, and not to, like, say, go read my, like, LinkedIn posts. But, like, I actually talk a lot about this stuff on LinkedIn pretty often, and and I put out a lot of content about, you know, my perspective on data breaches and things that are happening in the industry and and vulnerabilities. Sometimes it's a little bit confrontational, so forewarn all the listeners and viewers that I I am a little bit of a I I take a little bit more of a confrontational tone with how I give security advice.

But at at the same time, you know, again, back to, you know, re you know, the security community is very approachable in cryptos, reaching out to folks and educating yourself. You don't know what you don't know, so bring in experts. You know, I get asked often, like I mentioned, maybe two weeks ago, I got asked to speak with a board of a very large crypto platform about kind of the general security landscape. You know, if you're on a board, you're an executive at a company, bring in outside speakers.

I am not volunteering myself to do all of them, but I'm sure there are folks that would be willing to. And for the right folks that I, you know, am connected with, I'm usually happy to help. But, you know, bring in outside folks to if nothing else, have a hour long conversation with key folks at your organization

to really suss out and really figure out, like, how you should be maybe thinking about this through some objective third party opinions. Yeah. Awesome, man. Well, I'm we'll hear it on having you on more. This is a big very, very big and important conversation to have, so I'd love to have you back. Thanks for your time today. And,

yeah, we'll stay in touch. Great. Sounds good. Have a great one. Thanks, man.